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The Knowledge Argument is Either Indefensible or Redundant 
Dr Tom McClelland – University of Warwick 
 
Introduction 
Jackson’s (1982) formulation of the knowledge argument (KA) has had an inestimable influence on 
the discussion of consciousness and the apparent problem it presents for physicalism. A common 
objection to KA is the ‘ignorance objection’. According to this objection, our intuitions about Mary 
merely reflect our ignorance of physical facts that are integral to the explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness (e.g. Dennett 1991; Stoljar 2006). Armed with the insights of a future science, Mary 
would actually be able to deduce what it’s like to see red. We only have the intuition that Mary 
would learn something new because we don’t know the things she knows. Those sympathetic to KA 
have brushed away the ignorance objection on the grounds that even though we don’t know what 
the future science of consciousness will reveal, we do know what kind of facts it will contain and 
know that this is the wrong kind of fact from which to deduce facts about phenomenal 
consciousness. In other words, they suggest that the insight that underwrites KA is ‘future-proof’: it 
is not the kind of insight that could be displaced by new scientific knowledge. I argue that this 
strategy for defending KA is dialectically problematic and reveals a fundamental limitation of the 
argument. 
To future-proof KA the anti-physicalist would need to identify some feature credibly possessed by all 
physical facts – both known and unknown – and demonstrate that phenomenal facts cannot be 
deduced from facts possessing that feature.1 The problem for advocates of KA is that if they can 
establish something about the nature of physical facts that precludes them from entailing 
phenomenal facts, there would be no need for the knowledge argument: we could rule out 
physicalism without having to trade intuitions about the epistemic situation of a subject with 
complete physical knowledge. So if KA were to be future-proofed, it would thereby be rendered 
redundant. But if, on the other hand, KA is not future-proofed then the ignorance objection stands 
and KA is indefensible. My master argument against KA thus runs as follows: 
1) KA is defensible only if it can be future-proofed. 
2) If KA can be future-proofed then it is redundant. 
                                                          
1 Of course, if physicalism is true then there’s a sense in which phenomenal facts are physical facts, so a more 
accurate characterisation would be that anti-physicalists must identify some feature credibly possessed by all 
non-phenomenal physical facts. Even if phenomenal facts are physical, they are not the facts that Mary is given 
in her black-and-white room, so it’s appropriate to limit ourselves to physical facts of the kind that Mary would 
find in her textbooks. 
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3) Therefore KA is either indefensible or redundant. 
In the first two sections I make the case for ‘1’ and ‘2’ respectively, considering various potential 
objections along the way. In the third section I conclude that KA is either indefensible or redundant 
and reflect on what this means for our understanding of consciousness and the case against 
physicalism. 
 
1. KA Is Defensible Only if it Can Be Future-Proofed 
1.1. The Ignorance Objection 
If Mary were locked in her black-and-white room with full access to today’s physics and 
neuroscience, it should be pretty uncontroversial that she would not find herself in a position to 
deduce what it’s like to see red. But clearly this would have little bearing on the prospects of 
physicalism (all but the bravest physicalists would readily concede that we don’t yet know the 
physical facts that entail what it’s like to see red). KA rests on the claim that Mary would be unable 
to deduce the relevant phenomenal facts even if she had access to an ideal science that contained 
every physical fact that could be relevant to the perception of redness. This ideal science would 
contain many of the facts mentioned in today’s science, but it would also contain other facts of 
which we are currently ignorant. Some of these facts may even be radically unlike anything 
contained in our best current theories. Given our ignorance of these facts, how can we trust our 
intuitions about Mary’s epistemic situation? How can we rule out the hypothesis that knowledge of 
these as-yet-unknown physical facts would equip Mary to deduce what it’s like to see red?  
The ignorance objection can be bolstered by appeal to historical cases in which arguments 
analogous to KA appeared plausible but were shown by later scientific discoveries to be misguided. 
Stoljar (2006) highlights an argument put forward by C.D. Broad for the conclusion that chemical 
facts (i.e. facts about how different elements combine) are not entailed by non-chemical facts (i.e. 
facts about the nature of the constituent elements). Broad suggested that even with complete 
knowledge of oxygen, and complete knowledge of hydrogen, one would not be able to deduce that 
the two elements would combine. From this epistemic premise he drew the metaphysical conclusion 
that chemical properties are emergent properties irreducible to non-chemical properties. But 
Broad’s conclusion was false. We now know that the quantum-mechanical properties of oxygen and 
hydrogen explain why they combine, so with complete knowledge of the elements one would be 
able to deduce how they would interact. Stoljar draws the following lessons from Broad’s mistake: 
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Just as the chemical argument was plausible to him, so the knowledge argument is 
plausible to us. Just as it is mistaken to follow the chemical argument to its 
conclusion, so it is mistaken to follow the knowledge argument to its conclusion. 
Finally, just as Broad was ignorant of a type of nonchemical truth relevant to the 
nature of chemistry, so, too, we are ignorant of a type of nonexperiential truth 
relevant to the nature of experience. (2006, p. 140) 
Different advocates of the ignorance objection take different views on the depth of our ignorance. 
Some simply say that we are ignorant of the physical facts from which the phenomenal facts can be 
deduced (e.g. Dennett 1991). Some make the stronger claim that currently we do not even have the 
concepts needed to frame the relevant physical facts (e.g. Stoljar 2006). Others go further still and 
claim that we don’t even have the psychological faculties needed to acquire the necessary concepts 
(e.g. McGinn 1989).2 Different authors also take differing views on the content of our ignorance. 
Some say that the relevant unknown facts are neuroscientific (Dennett 1991), some appeal to our 
‘Russellian’ ignorance of the intrinsic nature of matter (Strawson 1994; this volume) and others 
maintain a cautious neutrality on the character of the unknown facts (Stoljar 2006). For our 
purposes there is no need to adjudicate on these matters. There is a diverse family of positions 
revolving around a simple objection to KA: that Mary’s knowledge of as-yet-unknown physical facts 
would equip her to deduce what it’s like to see red. 
How can advocates of KA respond to the ignorance objection? A concessive response might be to 
qualify KA so its conclusion is that either physicalism is false or that physicalism is true and we are 
ignorant of the physical facts responsible for phenomenal consciousness. This weakened formulation 
of KA would be unsatisfactory. The burden of proof is on anti-physicalists to show that physicalism is 
false, so an anti-physicalist argument that leaves open the second disjunct is no anti-physicalist 
argument at all.3 If an argument gives us a choice between adopting anti-physicalism and adopting 
                                                          
2 If we don’t have the psychological faculties needed to acquire the concepts with which to frame the physical 
facts responsible for consciousness, then it could be argued that Mary would be unable to gain complete 
physical knowledge. If her psychological constitution is like ours, then these physical facts would be hidden 
from her. However, the point of the Mary thought experiment is that she is an ideal epistemic subject. If her 
possession of complete physical knowledge requires her to have psychological faculties quite unlike ours, then 
this can simply be built into the thought experiment. 
3 It is worth reflecting on where the burden of proof is here. Since our knowledge of the physical facts that 
might underwrite phenomenal consciousness is dramatically limited, it is tempting to say that we ought to be 
agnostic between physicalism and anti-physicalism. However, the general considerations in favour of 
physicalism (mainly those pertaining to parsimony and causal closure) give us defeasible evidence in its favour. 
As such, in the absence of defeaters it is reasonable to assume that as-yet-unknown physical facts will entail 
the phenomenal facts. KA thus effectively begs the question against physicalism by illicitly assuming that new 
physical knowledge won’t yield an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Given our ignorance we must 
acknowledge that when all the physical facts are in it might transpire that physicalism is false, but in order to 
4 
 
physicalism then, other things being equal, we ought to choose physicalism, so KA doesn’t put 
physicalists under any real pressure. 
In order to defend itself against the ignorance objection, KA cannot be so concessive. A robust 
defence of KA must give us reason to believe that the physical facts contained in an ideal science will 
be no more suited to entailing all the phenomenal facts than are the physical facts described by our 
current theories. If our intuitions about Mary’s epistemic situation are based merely on the fact that 
today’s science doesn’t come close to enabling one to deduce what it’s like to be in a certain brain 
state, then those intuitions should not be trusted. But if our intuitions are instead based on an 
appreciation of the nature of physical facts as such, then those intuitions may give us a genuine 
insight into Mary’s epistemic situation. This would be a ‘future-proof’ insight – the kind of insight 
that doesn’t risk being displaced by future scientific discoveries. 
The above makes a strong case for the first premise of my master argument against KA. If the 
ignorance objection stands unchallenged, then we cannot reasonably trust our intuitions about the 
Mary thought experiment and KA should be dismissed as unsound. If, on the other hand, KA can be 
future-proofed then it survives the ignorance objection to fight again another day. We can thus 
conclude that KA is defensible only if it can be future-proofed. Before I make my case for the second 
premise of the master argument more needs to be said about what future-proofing KA would 
involve. 
1.2. The Conditions of Future-Proofing 
The best way to understand what future-proofing would involve is to look at how advocates of KA 
have defended themselves against the ignorance objection. One defence is that besides being 
unable to explain the phenomenal facts with our current scientific theories, we cannot even imagine 
a scientific theory that would explain the phenomenal facts (Chalmers 1996). This distinguishes 
phenomenal consciousness from other as-yet-unexplained natural phenomena. Marine biologists 
don’t yet know how phytoplankton share an ecosystem without wiping each other out, but we can 
at least imagine what such an explanation would look like. Yet when we try to imagine a scientific 
theory of consciousness that would allow Mary to deduce what it’s like to see red, we come up 
short. So we can conclude that even though Mary is blessed with knowledge of an ideal science, she 
would be unable to deduce the relevant phenomenal facts.  
This line of defence against the ignorance objection is persuasively undermined by P.S. Churchland: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
meet its burden of proof KA needs to provide positive non-question-begging reasons to conclude that the 
physical facts won’t entail the phenomenal facts.  
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Adding I cannot imagine explaining P merely adds a psychological fact about the 
speaker, from which again, nothing significant follows about the nature of the 
phenomenon in question. Whether we can or cannot imagine a phenomenon being 
explained in a certain way is a psychological fact about us, not an objective fact 
about the nature of the phenomenon itself… (1996 p. 407)4 
To see why the appeal to imagination fails as a defence against the ignorance objection, consider 
again Broad’s argument for emergentism. Broad might have insisted that he couldn’t even imagine a 
non-chemical explanation of the chemical fact that oxygen combines with hydrogen. But all this 
would have revealed is a failure of imagination on Broad’s part and not any insight into the nature of 
chemical truths. The ignorance objection is premised on the observation that ignorance can lead our 
intuitions astray. Appeals to what we can and cannot imagine won’t help fend off this objection for 
the simple reason that our ignorance can also influence what we are capable of imagining.  
The failure of this appeal to imagination suggests that advocates of KA need to say something more 
substantive about why it is implausible that future scientific discoveries will allow Mary to deduce 
the relevant phenomenal facts. Advocates of KA are unconvinced by the ignorance objection 
because they think physical facts are simply the wrong kind of fact from which to deduce 
phenomenal facts. As such, it doesn’t matter that we’re ignorant of many of the physical facts that 
Mary would know. Those unknown facts are of the same kind as the physical facts with which we are 
familiar, and no facts of that kind are suited to entailing phenomenal facts. Of course, the credibility 
of this line of thought depends on how the notion of ‘wrong kind of fact’ is unpacked. I suggest that 
advocates of KA must identify a ‘future-proof feature’ of physical facts such that: 
i) There is strong reason to believe all physical facts have feature F. 
ii) We know that phenomenal facts have feature G. 
iii) We know that in principle there can be no entailment from facts with feature F to 
facts with feature G. 
Claims about what kind of facts will be disclosed by future science are inevitably difficult to justify, so 
requiring us to know that all physical facts have feature F may be too demanding. This is why the 
first condition is framed in terms of having strong reason to believe that all physical facts have this 
feature. This qualification isn’t necessary for the second condition: advocates of KA ought to know 
                                                          
4 Churchland’s comments are directed against the ‘Hard Problem’ rather than KA. Against KA, she actually 
takes the stand that even though Mary would learn something new, this wouldn’t be at odds with physicalism 
(1996, p. 403). Nevertheless, her comments reflect something of the spirit of the ignorance objection to KA. 
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what it is about phenomenal facts that precludes their entailment by physical facts.5 KA concerns a 
specific phenomenal fact – the fact that seeing red has the particular phenomenology it has – but 
the argument is meant to yield an insight into the irreducibility of phenomenal facts across the 
board, hence the generality of the second condition. It is important that the third condition includes 
the ‘in principle’ clause. If one merely had a hunch that facts with feature F cannot entail facts with 
feature G, this would not be enough to fend off the ignorance objection. The objector could simply 
respond that since we are ignorant of some of the physical facts with feature F, our hunch could 
merely reflect our ignorance. So to avoid begging the question against the ignorance objection, we 
need a future-proof feature that we can be sure precludes entailment of phenomenal facts in 
principle. Anything based on the observation that all known facts with feature F fail to entail facts 
with feature G would be inadequate: a deeper insight is needed that justifies the conclusion that 
even unknown facts with feature F will fail to entail facts with feature G. 
If advocates of KA can identify a future-proof feature, then the ignorance objection can be dismissed 
on the grounds that we have strong reason to believe that unknown physical facts would not help 
Mary deduce what it’s like to see red. If such a feature cannot be identified, then it is very hard to 
see how the advocate of KA could rule out the hypothesis that Mary’s knowledge of as-yet-unknown 
physical facts would allow her to deduce the relevant phenomenal facts from her black-and-white 
room. Put simply, KA can be future-proofed if and only if a candidate future-proof feature can be 
found that satisfies the three conditions above.  
Although a number of such features have been proposed in the literature, there are two features 
that have attracted significant support: the objectivity of physical facts and the structural nature of 
physical facts. I will present the prima facie case for regarding each of these as future-proof features. 
I will not evaluate whether these proposed features stand up to scrutiny: my master argument 
against KA is neutral on whether KA can in fact be future-proofed, so it does not matter whether you 
find either of these candidate future-proof features convincing. My purpose here is simply to 
illustrate what a rebuttal of the ignorance objection would have to look like. 
                                                          
5 One interesting possibility is that one might identify a feature F of physical facts and know that facts with that 
feature cannot entail the phenomenal facts without being able to pin down what it is about the phenomenal 
facts that makes them unsuited to being entailed by facts with feature F. In this scenario, our justification 
bottoms out with intuitions about the nature of the phenomenal and there is no need to identify any feature F 
of all phenomenal facts. I bracket this possibility for two reasons. First, the future-proof features identified in 
the literature are such that a property G of phenomenal facts is identified. Second, the defence of KA would 
certainly be stronger if a property G could be identified that explains why the phenomenal facts cannot be 
entailed by the physical facts, so in the first instance we ought to pursue future-proof features that satisfy 
condition ‘ii’. 
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The first candidate future-proof feature of physical facts is objectivity. At a first pass, objective facts 
are those that are understandable from many points of view. In order to understand physical facts 
about the brain for example, it is not necessary for you to have had any specific kind of experience. 
The physical facts described in today’s science are objective. Moreover, it is plausible that all 
physical facts are objective - Nagel describes the physical as ‘…a domain of objective facts par 
excellence…’ (1974 p. 442). This suggests that objectivity satisfies the first condition. Subjective facts 
are those that are understandable only if one adopts a certain point of view (see Crane, this 
volume).6 In order to understand what it’s like to be a bat, for example, it is necessary for one to 
adopt the bat-ish point of view and have the kind of experiences that bats have (Nagel 1974). 
Phenomenal facts are subjective. The case of Mary might be regarded as illustrative of this: it is only 
by experiencing redness for herself that Mary can learn what it’s like to see red. This indicates that 
the second condition is satisfied. It is also plausible that subjective facts cannot be deduced from 
objective facts. From objective facts we can deduce further objective facts, but we cannot deduce 
ourselves into an unfamiliar perspective – we cannot reason ourselves into having some new kind of 
experience. But subjective facts, by their very nature, can only be learned if we have the relevant 
kind of experience for ourselves, thus we cannot deduce the subjective facts from the objective 
facts. This indicates that objectivity satisfies the third condition. There is thus a prima facie case for 
objectivity being a future-proof feature of physical facts, as captured by the following three theses: 
iobj) There is strong reason to believe all physical facts are objective. 
iiobj) We know that phenomenal facts are subjective. 
iiiobj) We know that in principle there can be no entailment from objective facts to 
subjective facts. 
The second candidate future-proof feature is being structural. At a first pass, structural facts are 
those that pertain exclusively to spatial, temporal and causal relations between entities. Non-
structural facts are those that involve anything over and above spatial, temporal and causal relations 
between entities.7 It is plausible that current science describes only structural facts: neuroscience, 
for instance, describes nothing more than spatial, temporal and dynamic relations between neurons 
                                                          
6 There are many senses of the term ‘subjective’. Here I have used the understanding of the term most 
pertinent to KA, but other senses of the term may also be relevant to our assessment of physicalism. Indeed, I 
have suggested elsewhere (McClelland 2013) that phenomenal states are subjective in the sense that there is 
something it is like to be in those states for the subject, and that it is this understanding of subjectivity that 
captures the deeper problem for physicalists. 
7 How best to draw the structural/non-structural distinction is a matter of some controversy. For an insightful 
assessment of the options see Alter (2015). For those uncomfortable with my simple characterisation of the 
distinction, I would reiterate that it is not especially important to the argument of this paper how the 
distinction is understood. The characterisation offered is meant to be more illustrative than definitive. 
8 
 
and other brain cells at various levels. Moreover, it is plausible that future science will also describe 
only structural facts as scientific descriptions of entities are based only on how those entities 
interact with our senses and measuring instruments (or with other entities that in turn interact with 
our senses and measuring instruments).8 This indicates that being structural satisfies the first 
condition. Phenomenal facts are plausibly non-structural. Phenomenal facts involve the instantiation 
of phenomenal qualities, such as phenomenal redness, and phenomenal qualities cannot be 
characterised in purely structural terms - they are intrinsic properties that transcend any purely 
structural characterisation.9 This indicates that the second condition is satisfied. Finally, it is plausible 
that ‘…from structure and dynamics, one can infer only structure and dynamics.’ (Chalmers 2002, p. 
259) Though the structural facts of microphysics might entail the facts of biology or neuroscience, 
these are plausibly still structural facts, just on a different scale to those described by microphysics. 
This indicates that being structural satisfies the third condition.10 There is thus a prima facie case for 
concluding that being structural is a future-proof feature satisfying all three conditions. Call the 
following three theses the Structural Theses: 
istr) There is strong reason to believe all physical facts are structural. 
iistr) We know that phenomenal facts are non-structural. 
iiistr) We know that in principle there can be no entailment from structural facts to 
non-structural facts. 
It will be useful for the remainder of the paper to have one candidate future-proof feature in mind 
as I develop my argument against KA. I will focus on being structural, rather being objective, for two 
reasons: one, I think there are serious objections to objectivity being a future-proof feature that do 
                                                          
8 There are several different routes to this kind of conclusion: the Russellian route (Russell 1927) is driven by 
the claim that the causal nature of perception means that it can only tell us about the causal structure of 
percepts; the Ramseyan Humility route (Lewis 2009) is driven by the claim that the nature of theoretical 
predicates is such that they can only be used to give structural characterisations of phenomena; the Kantian 
Humility route (Langton 1998; Jackson 1998) is driven by the claim that the affective nature of knowledge 
cannot disclose the intrinsic nature of entities. These views and others overlap in various ways but also make a 
number of independent claims. Since I’m not concerned in this paper with evaluating the claim that scientific 
descriptions are inevitably structural, I will not put these issues to one side. 
9 This is not to say that phenomenal facts do not involve structure. Clearly, facts about my current 
phenomenology will include facts about the structure of qualities in my field of awareness. The point remains, 
however, that phenomenal facts are not purely structural. In other words, there is always a non-structural 
aspect to our phenomenal states. 
10 One might say that it’s analytic that the third condition is satisfied given what it means for facts to be 
structural and what it means for them to be non-structural. If so, this would offer a particularly robust 
satisfaction of the third condition. Nevertheless, the condition itself needn’t be formulated in such a way as to 
demand this. 
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not apply to the structural view;11 two, the structural option is perhaps the more influential position 
in the literature today, with leading anti-physicalists such as Chalmers (2010) regarding it as the 
cornerstone of the case against physicalism.  
That said, it is worth addressing one prominent objection to the Structural Theses. Some have 
suggested that although science can only describe structural physical facts, there are also non-
structural physical facts beyond the reach of scientific description (e.g. Pereboom 2011). Although 
we have no way of knowing these non-structural facts, we can infer that they exist because 
structural facts must be grounded in non-structural facts. So underwriting facts about the causal 
dynamics of physical entities, there are facts about the intrinsic nature of those entities. If this line of 
thought is accurate then the first structural thesis - ‘istr’ - is false. This would mean that advocates of 
the ignorance objection can propose that facts about phenomenal consciousness are deducible from 
physical facts that include these non-structural facts, and that it is our ignorance of these non-
structural facts that leads our intuitions about Mary astray. 
This ‘Russellian’ response to KA is worth taking very seriously, and I have defended a version of it 
elsewhere (McClelland 2013). However, it is controversial whether this objection to KA constitutes a 
vindication of physicalism. Some might hold that these non-structural facts are not properly 
described as physical facts. If it is constitutive of physical facts that they are the kind of fact that can 
be uncovered by scientific enquiry, then the non-structural facts in question would come out as non-
physical. Furthermore, even if non-structural facts are deemed to qualify as physical facts, we’re left 
with an unorthodox version of physicalism with which many physicalists would be unhappy. It would 
respect the letter of physicalism by avoiding positing non-physical facts, but would violate the spirit 
of physicalism by positing facts beyond the reach of scientific enquiry. In order to side-step these 
worries, I will add the proviso that if KA can be future-proofed by an appeal to the structural nature 
of physical facts, then this would rule out an orthodox physicalism but would not rule out Russellian 
physicalism.12 Ruling out orthodox physicalism would of course be a dramatic result for KA, so there 
is no harm in bracketing the Russellian view for current purposes. 
 
2. If KA Can Be Future-Proofed Then It Is Redundant 
2.1. The Redundancy of KA 
                                                          
11 The most serious objection is that the subjective/objective distinction is fundamentally an epistemological 
distinction rather than a metaphysical condition, which makes it hard to justify the claim that physical facts 
must be objective. The view that some physical facts are subjective is developed in detail by Howell (2013). 
12 Chalmers suggests that the conclusion of anti-physicalist arguments like KA ought to be that either 
physicalism is false or Russellianism is true (1996). Here I am in line with his assessment. 
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We have seen that in order to future-proof KA, one must identify a candidate future-proof feature of 
physical facts that satisfies the three conditions specified. The problem for KA is that if such a future-
proof feature can be identified, then there is no need for KA. If we have good reason to believe that 
physical facts are not the kind of facts from which phenomenal facts can be deduced, then we have 
good reason to believe that physicalism is false. To see this, consider again the suggestion that being 
structural is a future-proof feature of physical facts. If the three Structural Theses stand up to 
scrutiny, then anti-physicalists can offer the following structural argument against physicalism: 
1) There is strong reason to believe all physical facts are structural. 
2) We know that phenomenal facts are non-structural. 
3) We know that in principle there can be no entailment from structural facts to non-
structural facts. 
4) If there is no entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts then 
physicalism is false. 
5) Therefore there is strong reason to believe that physicalism is false. 
Premises 1-3 are simply the three Structural Theses, so their truth is guaranteed if being structural 
satisfies the three conditions of being a future-proof feature. Advocates of KA are already 
committed to the truth of premise 4 as this is what enables them to move from an epistemic 
premise about Mary to a metaphysical conclusion about physicalism. So if a formulation of KA 
future-proofed by an appeal to the structural nature of physical facts is sound, then the structural 
argument against physicalism is also sound. And if the structural argument against physicalism is 
sound, then KA is redundant. A future-proofed formulation of KA will include all the premises of the 
structural argument above plus further premises about Mary and her epistemic situation. But such 
an argument would be surplus to requirements as the simpler structural argument would suffice to 
demonstrate the falsity of physicalism. This is not to say that the structural argument against 
physicalism is actually sound. It is just to say that if a formulation of KA reinforced by the Structure 
Theses is sound, then the structural argument against physicalism is sound and that KA would 
therefore be redundant. 
The same applies for any candidate future-proof feature one might use to reinforce KA. If objectivity 
satisfies the relevant conditions, then one can offer an objectivity argument against physicalism that 
makes no reference to Mary and her epistemic situation. An analogy might help capture the 
dialectical situation here. Imagine you need help lifting a heavy piece of furniture, but the person 
who helps you is so strong that they can lift the furniture by themselves, rendering your efforts 
11 
 
entirely surplus to requirements. The advocate of KA is in an analogous position with their project of 
refuting physicalism. The ignorance objection shows that KA is only defensible if suitably reinforced, 
but any suitable reinforcement can do the job on its own, thus rendering KA redundant. This is my 
initial case for premise 2 of the master argument against KA. To develop this case further, I will 
consider three potential objections to the claim that if KA can be future-proofed then it is 
redundant. 
 
2.2. Objections & Replies 
The first objection is that even if the structural argument against physicalism (or its equivalent for 
any other candidate future-proof feature) constitutes a self-standing argument against physicalism, 
it doesn’t follow that KA is redundant. The structural argument taken in isolation gives us some 
reason to reject physicalism, but the structural argument in tandem with KA gives us more reason to 
reject physicalism. So long as the case against physicalism is better with KA than without it, then it is 
wrong to say that KA is redundant. 
The difficulty with this objection is that KA more likely hinders the case against physicalism than 
helps it. As a general rule, it is better to take on no more commitments than one needs to justify 
one’s conclusion. If the anti-physicalist takes on the commitments not just of the structural 
argument but also of KA, then they leave themselves open to objections to those further 
commitments. The Mary scenario is a contentious thought experiment. It raises challenging issues 
regarding: what’s involved in having complete physical knowledge; what’s involved in having ideal 
reasoning skills; what exactly Mary learns on escaping her room; whether what Mary learns is a new 
fact; and so on. Physicalists will challenge the assumptions anti-physicalists make about these issues. 
One option for anti-physicalists is to defend those assumptions against physicalist attacks. But an 
alternative, more dialectically advisable, strategy is to cut these assumptions loose. The case against 
physicalism needn’t be weighed down by these commitments. Even if they are commitments with 
which anti-physicalists are comfortable, it is ill-advised to present physicalists with such easy targets. 
Chalmers notes that ‘…many of the common responses to those thought experiments have no clear 
application as a response to the simple [structural] arguments…’ (2010, p. xv) By dispensing with the 
Mary thought experiment the anti-physicalist can side-step those responses entirely and present a 
leaner, more defensible, case against physicalism. 
The second objection is that the structural argument against physicalism is not self-standing as it 
relies on KA for its plausibility. Alter advocates a version of the structural argument against 
physicalism but thinks that the plausibility of this argument is inseparable from the plausibility of KA: 
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I noted that the structure and dynamics argument’s three main claims suggest a 
deductive argument for the epistemic gap. But that argument is not independent of 
the considerations typically used to establish the gap: intuitions about the Mary 
case, zombie cases, and other such thought experiments. (2015, p. 6) 
If this is true, then KA is far from redundant. The structural argument against physicalism only works 
in tandem with KA because the Structural Theses only get their warrant from the Mary thought 
experiment. As Alter puts it, our intuitions about Mary are ‘epistemically prior’ to the relevant claims 
about structure (2015, p. 7). 
I concede that the Mary scenario might be used to motivate the three Structural Theses that drive 
the structural argument against physicalism. To motivate the claim that all physical facts are 
structural you might observe that Mary – a subject with complete physical knowledge – lacks 
knowledge of any non-structural facts, indicating that there are no non-structural physical facts. To 
motivate the claim that phenomenal facts are non-structural you might observe that Mary learns a 
phenomenal fact on leaving her room, yet already knows all the structural facts, so must be learning 
a phenomenal fact that is non-structural. To motivate the claim that one cannot deduce non-
structural facts from structural facts you might observe that Mary cannot deduce non-structural 
facts about phenomenal consciousness from her complete knowledge of the structural facts.  
However, just because the Structural Theses can be motivated by appeal to Mary doesn’t mean that 
they need to be, or even that they ought to be. The premises don’t need to be motivated this way 
because each can be motivated without reference to a subject in Mary’s epistemic position. The 
claim that all physical facts are structural might be motivated by the epistemological claim that we 
can only gain knowledge of physical entities via how they affect us, meaning we can describe only 
their dispositions to interact with us and other entities (see footnote 8). The claim that phenomenal 
facts are non-structural might be motivated by introspection of the qualities of one’s phenomenal 
states. The claim that one cannot deduce non-structural facts from structural facts might be 
motivated a priori on the grounds that facts about spatial, temporal and causal relations can entail 
only further facts about spatial, temporal and causal relations. 
The above indicates that the structural argument could be motivated without appeal to KA. I would 
go further and suggest that it ought to be motivated without appeal to KA. The point of introducing 
structure as a future-proof feature of physical facts is to fend off the ignorance objection KA. But if 
the relevant claims about structure are motivated with reference to KA, then the ignorance 
objection comes back to haunt the anti-physicalist. Whatever one’s prior commitments are 
regarding physicalism, it is clear that Mary knows a wealth of physical facts of which we are deeply 
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ignorant. So how, from our position of ignorance, do we know that Mary’s complete physical 
knowledge won’t include non-structural facts? How, from our position of ignorance, do we know 
that Mary would learn a new non-structural fact on leaving her room? How, from our position of 
ignorance, do we know that Mary would be unable to deduce non-structural facts about 
phenomenal consciousness from her complete knowledge of structural physical facts? If we have a 
deeper justification for these claims, then it is this deeper justification that underwrites our 
understanding of the structural and not our intuitions about the Mary scenario. If we have no 
deeper justification for these claims, then they should not be given much credence as they might 
simply reflect our ignorance of the physical facts. 
Overall, this presents Alter with a serious dilemma: if the three Structural Theses can only be 
motivated by KA, then both KA and the structural argument against physicalism fail. KA fails because 
our ignorance of the physical facts known by Mary renders our intuitions about Mary unreliable, and 
the structural argument against physicalism fails insofar as it depends on those intuitions about 
Mary. If, on the other hand, the Structural Theses can be motivated without reference to KA than 
the structural argument suffices to refute physicalism and KA is redundant. The Structural Theses 
would put conclusions about Mary’s situation on a much surer footing, but those conclusions would 
not need to be given any role in the case against physicalism. 
We now come to the third and final objection to my claim that if KA can be future-proofed then it is 
redundant. A critic might concede that the structural argument makes a self-standing case against 
physicalism whilst maintaining that the Mary thought experiment is nevertheless needed to make 
the structural argument vivid.13 Even if the Mary scenario isn’t integral to the case against 
physicalism, it is still integral to the exposition of that case. The structural argument is dry and 
abstract and the Mary scenario ameliorates these problems by presenting interlocutors with a 
concrete scenario: a scenario that tends to elicit strong intuitions. On this view, the Mary scenario is 
dialectically redundant in that a sound argument against physicalism can be provided without it, but 
it is not rhetorically redundant as it is a valuable and effective tool for making the case against 
physicalism vivid and for persuading interlocutors of its force. The Mary scenario serves to aid 
understanding, even if it doesn’t serve to make the case against physicalism more defensible. 
                                                          
13 Though Chalmers suggests that the structural argument is what really drives the case against physicalism, he 
does specifically note that thought experiments like the Mary scenario serve to make the case more vivid 
(2010, p. xv). In the same passage, Chalmers also suggests that thought experiments like the Mary scenario are 
‘…a useful technical device for making the arguments more formal and more analysable.’ (2010, p. xv) I’m not 
convinced that KA is any more formal than the structure argument against physicalism. As for being more 
analysable, KA might have the advantage of helping to make physicalist objections to anti-physicalism more 
clear, but this would be covered by the claim that KA helps make arguments more vivid. 
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Wartenburg offers some helpful reflections on the role of illustrations of philosophical ideas, citing 
Kant’s vivid image of pure understanding as a land of truth surrounded by a stormy sea of illusion. 
Wartenburg rightly notes that ‘Kant’s imagery here, though quite graphic, does not make a 
philosophical contribution to his argument, even if it helps a reader understand its general thrust.’ 
(2006, p. 21) The image is not redundant, but nor is it part of Kant’s argument in the first critique. 
Something similar might be said of the way in which movies can make philosophical arguments vivid. 
One might explain the case for Cartesian skepticism to an undergraduate audience, and then present 
them with The Matrix as a vivid illustration of a skeptical hypothesis. Even though the movie might 
help students understand skepticism and convince them to take it seriously, the movie shouldn’t be 
regarded as part of the argument for skepticism. The argument for skepticism is self-standing, and 
the movie merely serves to help communicate its force. 
Perhaps the role of the Mary scenario can be understood by analogy with the role of Kant’s 
metaphor, or of the lecturer’s movie presentation. Mary is a vivid illustration of the epistemic gap 
between structural physical facts and non-structural phenomenal facts. It serves to aid our 
understanding of the structural argument against physicalism, but doesn’t make a contribution to 
the merit of the argument itself. So even though the structural argument is a self-standing argument 
against physicalism, the Mary scenario is far from redundant. 
I see two possible responses to this defence of KA. The first is to say that the Mary scenario isn’t 
even needed to make the structural argument against physicalism vivid and persuasive. The thought 
experiment risks distracting interlocutors with unnecessary questions about the details of the 
scenario, and the case against physicalism is best made without reference to such thought 
experiments. I think this response would be too strong. There is no denying that the Mary scenario is 
a vivid thought experiment with the power to elicit strong intuitions. If I were trying to convince a 
neophyte of the case against physicalism, I wouldn’t want to present the structural argument 
without also presenting the Mary thought experiment. 
The second response is to concede, as I do, that the Mary scenario is far from redundant when it 
comes to communicating the case against physicalism. But the Mary scenario having illustrative 
value should not be confused with KA having dialectical force. To use the Mary scenario in this way is 
to borrow a thought experiment from KA whilst dispensing with the argument itself. KA is intended 
as an argument against physicalism, and has been treated as such for decades. Using the Mary 
scenario to illustrate a distinct argument against physicalism is far from a vindication of KA. It 
remains the case that KA itself is redundant, even if the thought-experiment that underwrites it is 
put to illustrative use elsewhere. The conclusion of the master argument is that KA – the argument 
against physicalism offered by Jackson – is either indefensible or redundant. The concession that the 
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Mary scenario – the thought-experiment used to drive KA – can still serve a rhetorical function is no 
concession at all. 
I have considered three objections to the claim that if KA can be future-proofed then it is redundant. 
Along the way, I hope to have clarified why KA would be rendered redundant and what exactly its 
redundancy amounts to. I have focused closely on being structural as a future-proof feature. I should 
reiterate that there is no commitment here to structure actually being a future-proof feature: the 
claim is just that if it is such a feature then it would render KA redundant for the reasons discussed. I 
should also reiterate that parallel considerations will, I suggest, apply to any candidate future-proof 
features. If objectivity were presented as the future-proof feature, we could formulate an objectivity 
argument against physicalism that renders KA redundant for all the same reasons. And the same 
goes for any other future-proof feature that the anti-physicalist might present as a candidate.14 
Overall, we are in a position to conclude that the second premise of the master argument against KA 
stands up to scrutiny. 
 
3. Therefore KA Is Either Indefensible Or Redundant 
The ignorance objection shows that KA is defensible only if it can be future-proofed. The 
considerations above show that if it can be future-proofed then it is redundant. We can thus infer 
that KA is either indefensible or redundant. I think there are three lessons we can learn from this 
conclusion, two of them negative and the third positive. 
The first lesson is that KA should be dispensed with as an argument against physicalism. If you are 
skeptical about the case against physicalism being future-proofed then you should dismiss KA as 
indefensible. If you are optimistic about the identification of a future-proof feature then you should 
dismiss KA as redundant. Either way, KA should not be taken seriously as an argument against 
physicalism. The thought experiment that drives KA can still serve a valuable illustrative role in 
discussion, but it cannot be taken as a self-standing case for rejecting physicalism. It is worth noting 
that my objections to KA do not rest on any presumption of physicalism. As with so many 
philosophical debates, the debate surrounding KA includes accusations of question-begging from 
both sides. Physicalist objections to KA are often too easily brushed away as betraying a 
presumption that physicalism is true, or a failure to take anti-physicalist intuitions seriously. No such 
                                                          
14 It might be suggested that KA has a more intimate relationship with other candidate future-proof features. 
Perhaps the case for regarding objectivity as a future-proof feature depends essentially on the plausibility of 
KA, meaning that KA is not rendered redundant. Although this possibility oughtn’t be dismissed out of hand, I 
think the burden of proof is on the critic to show that matters are any different for the other candidate future-
proof features. 
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response is available to the argument I have offered. I have argued that even if a compelling case 
against physicalism can be developed, it remains the case that KA ought to be dispensed with. I have 
offered an argument that concerns only the dialectical structure of the case against physicalism, and 
not the relative merits of physicalist and anti-physicalist views of phenomenal consciousness. 
The second lesson is that what goes for KA also goes for the conceivability argument (CA) and any 
other argument against physicalism based on comparable thought-experiments. The conceivability 
argument asks us to imagine a complete physical duplicate who lacks phenomenal consciousness. 
This means that all the physical facts that hold for us also hold for our duplicate. The ignorance 
objection presents a serious problem for CA. We are ignorant of many physical facts about 
ourselves, so when we try to conceive of a perfect physical duplicate, our attempts to do so are 
inevitably constrained by our ignorance. How can we rule out the hypothesis that if we had 
complete knowledge of the physical facts, then we would find zombie duplicates inconceivable? The 
only way is to identify some future-proof feature shared by all physical facts such that discovery of 
any facts with that feature could not alter the conceivability of zombies: so long as the physical facts 
about me and my duplicate have that feature, it will always be conceivable that my duplicate lacks 
phenomenal consciousness. As should now be clear, the difficulty with this response is that if it can 
be made to work, then CA would be rendered redundant. But if it cannot be made to work, then the 
ignorance objection stands and CA is indefensible. Thus CA is either indefensible or redundant. 
Perhaps there is an illustrative role left for the zombie thought-experiment to play, but dialectically 
speaking CA must be dispensed with.15 The same goes for versions of CA that appeal to qualia 
inversion and the like rather than to zombies. 
The third lesson is a positive recommendation that we ought to attend more closely to the question 
of whether physical facts have a future-proof feature that satisfies the three conditions specified. 
Consider the following passage from Chalmers about the structural argument against physicalism: 
There is a sense in which the argument here, which turns on simple issues about 
explanation, is more fundamental than conceivability arguments involving zombies, 
epistemological arguments involving Mary in her black-and-white room, and the 
like…It is sometimes supposed that nonreductive arguments turn essentially on 
these thought experiments, but this is just wrong. In fact…I suggest that the thought 
experiments turn essentially on points about structure and function... (2010, p. xv) 
                                                          
15 Heikinheimo & Vaaja (2011) offer a well-developed argument for the redundancy of the conceivability 
argument along these lines. They also assert that similar considerations apply to KA (2011, p. 24), so the 
current paper can be read as a vindication of that assertion. 
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I agree with Chalmers that the common understanding of the case against physicalism gets things 
upside down, and that in order to make progress in this debate we must turn things the right way 
around. If we want to establish whether phenomenal consciousness presents a threat to 
physicalism, we ought to turn our attention to whether there is a plausible future-proof feature of 
physical facts. If anti-physicalists can find such a feature, they would have a case against physicalism 
that avoids many of the pitfalls that have dominated discussion of KA and CA. If physicalists can 
systematically rebut the candidate future-proof features, they would have a defence of physicalism 
that no version of KA or CA could overcome. For the anti-physicalists, their project is likely to involve 
refining their characterisations of the structural/non-structural divide or the objective/subjective 
divide. For the physicalists their project will likely involve casting doubt on the claim that all physical 
facts have the putative future-proof feature, or on the claim that facts with that feature cannot 
entail the phenomenal facts. This paper does not take a stand on which side of the debate has the 
better prospects, but it does hope to offer a clear recommendation on how best to make progress in 
that debate. 
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